










ATOMISTIC CONGESTION TOLLS AT 
CONCENTRATED AIRPORTS? SEEKING A UNIFIED 
VIEW IN THE INTERNALIZATION DEBATE 
 
 
JAN K. BRUECKNER 
KURT VAN DENDER 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2033 









An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




ATOMISTIC CONGESTION TOLLS AT 
CONCENTRATED AIRPORTS? SEEKING A UNIFIED 





The goal of this paper is to bring some unity to the theoretical side of the debate on 
internalization of airport congestion by showing that all the literature’s theoretical results can 
be derived within one simple and unified framework. The analysis starts by replicating the 
results of Brueckner (2002), who showed that, because airlines behaving in Cournot fashion 
internalize congestion, they should be charged low congestion tolls. The analysis then 
validates the findings of Daniel (1995), who argued that larger atomistic tolls are required in a 
model where a Stackelberg leader interacts with competitive fringe airlines. However, it is 
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substitutes. 
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1. Introduction
Although the analysis of road congestion pricing has a long history, economists have only
recently extended the theory to the case of airports, where congestion has become a major
policy issue. The key diﬀerence between the two cases is that, while road users are atomistic,
airlines are not. In other words, while road users have no incentive to take account of the
congestion they impose on other drivers, an airline that schedules an extra ﬂight at a crowded
airport congests other airlines but also imposes congestion costs on the other ﬂights it operates.
Because some congestion is then internalized, airport congestion tolls apparently need not be
as large as the atomistic tolls implied by road-pricing theory.
Relying on a simulation model, Daniel (1995) was the ﬁrst to recognize the potential for
internalization of congestion, and Brueckner (2002, 2005) explored the idea further using simple
analytical models. Pels and Verhoef (2004), along with more recent contributions by Zhang
and Zhang (2006) and Basso and Zhang (2006), provided further elaboration. Comprehensive
empirical evidence in support of the internalization hypothesis was oﬀered by Mayer and Sinai
(2003), while Brueckner (2002) provided similar evidence using a much smaller data set. Both
papers showed that ﬂight delays are lower, other things equal, at highly concentrated airports,
where the dominant carrier is likely to internalize much of the congestion it creates, thus
limiting its extent.
Daniel (1995), despite identifying the potential for internalization of congestion, argued
that an atomistic model, where carriers ignore the congestion impact of their scheduling deci-
sions, is more empirically relevant. He argued that ﬂight cutbacks by a dominant airline aimed
at reducing congestion will be oﬀset by the response of fringe carriers, who will schedule more
ﬂights so as to leave overall congestion unchanged. As a consequence, the dominant carrier
1will forego such ﬂight cutbacks, in eﬀect acting atomistically. Daniel (1995) showed that the
intraday ﬂight patterns at the Minneapolis-St. Paul airport exhibit too much intertemporal
peaking to be consistent with internalization by the dominant carrier (Northwest), and that an
atomistic model ﬁts the data better. Daniel and Harback (2007) provided more extensive evi-
dence of this type for a larger number of U.S. airports, while also oﬀering a clearer exposition
of model underlying the exercise.1
The correct congestion-pricing policy at hub airports depends critically on whether inter-
nalization occurs. If Daniel’s contrary view is correct, then all carriers at the airport (the hub
carrier as well as its competitors) should be charged atomistic congestion tolls. If internaliza-
tion occurs, however, the hub carrier should be charged a low toll, reﬂecting internalization of
most of the congestion it creates, while the smaller carriers (who internalize less congestion)
should pay higher tolls. In the limit, as the hub carrier’s ﬂight share approaches 100 percent,
congestion tolls eﬀectively disappear, an outcome that can be used to argue against levying
any tolls at all at dominated hubs.
Despite the stark contrast between these policy implications, little eﬀort has been spent
in attempting to reach a consensus view in the internalization debate. Several obstacles to
such an outcome exist. First, the empirical ﬁndings in Daniel’s work and those of Mayer and
Sinai (2003) and Brueckner (2002) are based on very diﬀerent methodologies. Daniel looks for
excessive intraday traﬃc peaking as evidence of atomistic behavior, while the other work looks
at variation in delays across airports, relating it to diﬀerences in concentration in an indirect
test for internalization.
Consensus on the theoretical side of the debate is also stymied by the use of diﬀerent types
of models under the two approaches. While Daniel’s papers are based on a complex stochastic
queuing model, Brueckner (2002) and other authors use frameworks that are more elementary
and transparent.
Although reconciling the divergent sets of empirical evidence on internalization poses a
challenge, the goal of the present paper is to bring some unity to the theoretical side of
the internalization debate. This goal is achieved by showing that all the existing theoretical
results in the literature, including those of Daniel, can be derived within one simple and uniﬁed
2framework. With theoretical unity achieved, the diﬀerence between the opposing views is more
easily grasped, perhaps paving the way toward some sort of resolution.2
Using a model with two symmetric carriers and some key simplifying assumptions, the
analysis starts by characterizing the social optimum. Next, the equilibrium under Cournot
behavior is analyzed, and results analogous to those of Brueckner (2002) are derived. In
particular, it is shown that congestion tolls only half as large as the atomistic tolls from road-
pricing theory are required to support the optimum. Then, the analysis turns to Stackelberg
models like those favored by Daniel. In the ﬁrst model, a Cournot follower interacts with a
Stackelberg leader, a case that was brieﬂy analyzed by Brueckner (2002). The analysis demon-
strates that, while the follower continues to pay a Cournot congestion toll, the leader should
be charged a toll that lies somewhere between the Cournot toll and the larger atomistic toll.
In the second model, analogous to the one advanced by Daniel, a Stackelberg leader interacts
with competitive fringe carriers. It is shown that, because ﬂight adjustments by the leader
are completely oﬀset by the competitive fringe, the leader eﬀectively behaves atomistically,
not taking into account the eﬀect of its choices on airport congestion. In this case, atomistic
congestion tolls should be charged to both the leader and fringe in order to support the social
optimum. The analysis establishing these results is carried out in section 2 of the paper.
While the results for the Stackelberg/fringe model match the conclusions of Daniel, section
3 explores their sensitivity to relaxation of several simplifying assumptions. The analysis ﬁrst
relaxes the assumption that demand is perfectly elastic, which is meant to remove carrier
exploitation of market power from the model. It is shown, however, that atomistic tolls are
still required when demand is imperfectly elastic. By contrast, relaxing Section 2’s implicit
assumption that carrier outputs are perfect substitutes partly overturns Daniel’s conclusions.
With imperfect substitutability between the leader and fringe outputs, the leader partially
internalizes congestion, implying that he should be charged a toll that lies somewhere between
the Cournot and atomistic tolls. The toll structure is thus not strictly atomistic, but it may
nevertheless approximate the one prescribed by Daniel.
In light of these results, section 4 oﬀers some observations on the state of the internalization
debate and the implications for public policy.
32. Basic Analysis
2.1. The setup
Following Brueckner (2002), the analysis focuses on a single congested airport, without
considering network issues, as in done by Pels and Verhoef (2004) and Brueckner (2005). In
addition, the model collapses the peak and oﬀpeak periods from Brueckner’s (2002) analysis
into a single period where congestion is always present, an approach that follows Pels and
Verhoef (2004).
Given these assumptions, suppose that the congested airport is served by two airlines,
denoted 1 and 2. The carriers choose their ﬂight volumes to maximize proﬁt, and the resulting
equilibrium depends on the nature of interaction between them. In addition, the magnitude of
congestion tolls, which are required to eliminate any divergence between the equilibrium and
the social optimum, also depends on how the carriers interact.
The analysis considers three possible interaction scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario, the carriers
behave in Cournot fashion, with each taking the other’s ﬂight volume as ﬁxed in making choices.
In the second scenario, carrier 2 behaves in Cournot fashion while carrier 1 is a Stackelberg
leader, anticipating carrier 2’s responses to its choices. In the third scenario, carrier 2 behaves
in competitive fashion, viewing the level of congestion at the airport as unaﬀected by its ﬂight
volume, while carrier 1 is again a Stackelberg leader. In this last scenario, carrier 2 can be
viewed not as a single airline but as collection of competitive fringe carriers.
In order to maintain the simplest possible focus on the congestion phenomenon, most of
the analysis suppresses the market-power component found in many previous models. In these
models, a reduction in a carrier’s ﬂight volume reduces the level of airport congestion while
also raising fares through a standard market-power eﬀect. As a result, airline choices involve
both the exploitation of market power and the desire to limit congestion. To focus solely on the
congestion issue, market power is eliminated from the basic analysis by assuming that carriers
face a perfectly elastic demand for air travel. This assumption is relaxed in section 3 of the
paper once the basic results are derived.
Accordingly, it is assumed that passengers are willing to pay a ﬁxed “full price” p for
travel in and out of the congested airport.3 Since passengers dislike airport congestion, which
4imposes additional time costs, the actual fare that the airlines charge must be discounted
below this full price.4 To derive the discount, let f1 and f2 denote ﬂight volumes for the two
carriers, and let t(f1 +f2) denote the extra time cost per passenger due to congestion and the
resulting delays, a cost that depends on total ﬂights at the congested airport. While passenger
congestion cost is zero when total ﬂights are low, the t function eventually becomes positive,
with t  > 0,t    ≥ 0 holding over the positive range (so that the marginal congestion cost is
constant or rising). Taking account of passenger congestion cost, the airlines are then able to
charge a fare equal to p− t(f1 +f2). When congestion cost is added to this fare, the resulting
full price equals p.
It should be noted that the above framework involves the implicit assumption that the
two airlines oﬀer the same product, with their outputs selling at a common price. Stated
diﬀerently, the outputs of the two carriers are assumed to be perfect substitutes. To judge
the sensitivity of the ensuing results to this assumption, the analysis in section 3 relaxes it by
allowing imperfect substitutability.
Letting s denoted the ﬁxed seat capacity of an aircraft and assuming that all seats are
ﬁlled, the total number of seats sold by carrier i is then sfi,i=1 ,2. Multiplying by the fare,
revenue is
[p − t(f1 + f2)]sfi,i =1 ,2. (1)
In the absence of congestion, each airline incurs a cost per seat of τ, yielding operating
costs of τsf1 and τsf2 for the two carriers. However, airport congestion raises operating costs,
adding an extra cost of g(f1 + f2) for each ﬂight. Like t(·), the function g satisﬁes g ≥ 0a n d
g  > 0,g    ≥ 0w h e ng is positive (g is zero when f1 + f2 is small). Total costs for the two
airlines are then given by [τs+ g(f1 + f2)]f1 and [τs+ g(f1 + f2)]f2.
Combining the above information, airline proﬁts can be written
πi =[ p − t(f1 + f2)]sfi − [τs+ g(f1 + f2)]fi,i =1 ,2, (2)
and rewritten as
π1 =( p − τ)sf1 − c(f1 + f2)f1 (3)
5π2 =( p − τ)sf2 − c(f1 + f2)f2, (4)
where
c(f1 + f2) ≡ st(f1 + f2)+g(f1 + f2)( 5 )
gives passenger plus airline congestion cost per ﬂight. Given the properties of the t and g
functions, c   > 0a n dc    ≥ 0h o l dw h e nc is positive.
2.2. Social optimum
The ﬁrst step in the analysis is to characterize the social optimum. With perfectly elastic
demand, consumer surplus is zero, which means that the social optimum simply maximizes
the combined proﬁts of the carriers. After adding the proﬁt expressions in (3) and (4), diﬀer-
entiation with respect to f1 and f2 yields two identical ﬁrst-order conditions, given by
p − τ − [(f1 + f2)c   + c]/s =0 ( 6 )
The resulting solution is symmetric, with the common optimal ﬂight volume for the two carriers
found by substituting f1 = f2 = f in (6).
Condition (6) says that a carrier’s ﬂight volume is optimal when the full price p equals the
social marginal cost of a seat, which is given by τ plus the marginal social congestion cost per
seat. This latter cost is computed taking into account the congestion cost imposed on both
carriers when an extra ﬂight is operated. In particular, when f1 is increased, passenger plus
airline congestion costs for airline 1 (given by cf1)i n c r e a s eb yc + f1c  , while these costs for
airline 2 (given by cf2)i n c r e a s eb yf2c  . The sum of these two eﬀects, divided by s,g i v e st h e
marginal social congestion cost per seat.
2.3. Cournot behavior
The ensuing analysis characterizes equilibrium outcomes under diﬀerent types of airline
behavior and derives the congestion tolls needed to support the social optimum in each case.
Cournot behavior is considered ﬁrst.
6With Cournot behavior, each airline maximizes proﬁt viewing the other airline’s ﬂight
volume as ﬁxed. Thus, airline 1 chooses f1 to maximize (3) taking f2 as given, yielding the
ﬁrst-order condition
p − τ − [f1c   + c]/s =0 . (7)
Airline 2 satisﬁes an analogous condition. The diﬀerence between this condition and (6) is the
absence of f2c   in the last term. This absence shows that, in scheduling an extra ﬂight, airline
1 takes into account the additional congestion costs imposed on its own ﬂights (f1c  ), ignoring
the congestion imposed on airline 2 (f2c  ). Thus, while the airline internalizes some of the
congestion from an extra ﬂight, it ignores the impact on the other carrier. Airline 2 behaves
in analogous fashion.
With both carriers ignoring a portion of the congestion eﬀects they create, ﬂight volumes
are excessive, and a congestion toll is needed to reach the social optimum. The toll per ﬂight is
equal to that portion of the congestion damage from an extra ﬂight not internalizedby a carrier.
The toll is thus equal to f2c   for carrier 1 and f1c   for carrier 2, and evaluating at the optimum,
the toll is then given by T = f∗c  (2f∗), where f∗ is the common optimal ﬂight volume for the
two carriers. This toll can also be written as 1
2MCD∗,w h e r eM C D ∗ is the marginal congestion
damage from an extra ﬂight evaluated at the optimum, equal to marginal congestion cost per
ﬂight, c  (2f∗), times the number of ﬂights aﬀected, 2f∗. Thus, each carrier is charged a toll
equal to MCD∗ times its airport ﬂight share, which equals 1/2 in the symmetric equilibrium.
By contrast, a mechanical application of road pricing rules would incorrectlyimplyan atomistic
congestion toll equal to 100 percent of MCD∗. But this conclusion ignores the fact that each
airline internalizes half of the congestion it creates, namely, that imposed on its own ﬂights.
With the congestion-toll liabilities of f1T and f2T subtracted from carrier proﬁts, the resulting
Cournot equilibrium coincides with the social optimum.
Following the approach of Brueckner (2005), this symmetric model can be generalized
easily to cover the case of a hub airport, where the hub carrier has a high ﬂight share and
the other carrier a small share. Letting α>1/2 denote hub carrier’s share, it must pay
a relatively low toll of (1 − α)MCD∗, equal to the (small) portion of marginal congestion
7damage not internalized, while the nonhub airline pays a larger toll of αMCD∗, reﬂecting less
internalization.
2.4. Stackelberg behavior with a Cournot follower
Now suppose that airline 1 is a Stackelberg leader, with 2 the follower. In Cournot fashion,
carrier 2 chooses f2 viewing f1 as parametric, satisfying the condition
p − τ − [f2c   + c]/s =0 . (8)
To ﬁnd the response of f2 to a change in f1, needed in analyzing the leader’s behavior, the




f2c    + c  
f2c    +2 c   ≡− λ<0. (9)
The negative sign of (9), which follows from the maintained assumptions on the c function,
indicates that the airline 2 reduces its ﬂights in response to an increase in airline 1’s ﬂights.
Note that the λ expression in (9) is greater than 1/2 but less than unity, with the lower bound
corresponding to the limiting case where c    ≡ 0. Thus, airline 2 oﬀsets somewhere between
half and 100 percent of any increase in carrier 1’s ﬂights through a decrease in its own ﬂights.
Knowing the response of carrier 2 to its f1 choice, carrier 1 maximizes proﬁt from (3), and
the ﬁrst-order condition is













With −1 <∂ f 2/∂f1 < −1/2, the term involving c   in (10) is cut by more than half relative
to its value in (7), indicating a reduction in carrier 1’s internalization of congestion. The
airline anticipates that a reduction in f1 meant to reduce congestion will be mostly oﬀset by
an increase in f2 by the follower airline. Therefore, carrier 1’s incentive to limit its ﬂights to
restrain congestion is reduced relative to the Cournot case. Indeed, comparison of (9) and (10)
8shows that, for both conditions to be satisﬁed, f1 >f 2 must hold, indicating that carrier 1
operates more ﬂights than the follower.
Congestion tolls are once again needed to generate the optimum, but these tolls are now
diﬀerent across the carriers. Givenits Cournot behavior, carrier 2’s toll, denoted T2,i st h es a m e
as before, given by 1
2MCD∗. Carrier 1’s toll, however, must eliminate the diﬀerence between
the f1c  (1 + ∂f2/∂f1) term in (10) and the (f1 + f2)c   term in the optimality condition (6),
with this diﬀerence being evaluated at the optimum. Subtracting the ﬁrst expression from the











evaluated at the optimum, where MCD = (f1 + f2)c  . Recalling that the optimum has sym-




(1 + λ∗)MCD∗ (12)
where the asterisk indicates evaluation at the optimum. Thus, airline 1 pays a toll larger than
MCD* times its ﬂight share, reﬂecting its failure to internalize as much congestion as in the
Cournot case.
A subtlety in (13) is that λ,t h e−∂f2/∂f1 derivative from (9), must be evaluated at
f1 = f2 = f∗ (yielding λ∗) to compute carrier 1’s toll. However, in the special case where
the c function is linear, with c    =0 ,( 9 )s h o w st h a tλ is a constant equal to 1/2. In this
case, T1 reduces simply to 3
4MCD∗. Thus, the appropriate toll for the Stackelberg leader lies
exactly halfway between the Cournot toll of 1
2MCD∗ and the atomistic toll of MCD∗. While
this simple statement does not apply when c    > 0, the fact that 1/2 <λ ∗ < 1m e a n st h e
leader’s toll nevertheless lies somewhere between the Cournot toll and the atomistic toll, as
seen from inspection of (12).
Summarizing the preceding analysis yields
Proposition 1. With a Stackelberg leader and a Cournot follower, the follower is
charged a Cournot congestion toll, equal to 1/2 of the marginal congestion damage
9from an extra ﬂight. The leader is charged a toll that lies between this Cournot value
and the atomistic toll (which equals 100 percent of the marginal congestion damage
from an extra ﬂight).
Thus, when the follower acts in Cournot fashion, the leader’s Stackelberg behavior causes the
toll structure to move toward an atomistic structure, without fully reaching it.
2.5. Stackelberg behavior with a competitive fringe
Now suppose that airline 1 continues to behave in Stackelberg fashion but that airline
2 behaves competitively. In the present context, competitive behavior means that carrier 2
ignores the eﬀect of its own ﬂight choice on airport congestion, thus viewing the value of the c
function as parametric. The plausibility of such behavior can be heightened by viewing carrier
2 as collection of small competitive airlines rather than as a single entity, with f2 giving the
combined ﬂights for this group. Note that the overall scale of operations of these fringe airlines
need not itself be small. However, the airlines must have small ﬂight shares at the given airport,
justifying their parametric view of congestion. Thus, a fringe carrier could be a large airline
that operates only a few ﬂights into another carrier’s hub.
Viewing c as parametric, the proﬁt function (4) for carrier 2 is proportional to f2,w i t h
the proportionality factor equal to p − τ − c/s. If this expression is nonzero, then the airline
will prefer either a zero or inﬁnite ﬂight volume, an outcome inconsistent with the achievement
of equilibrium. To avoid this outcome, making carrier 2 indiﬀerent to its ﬂight volume, the
equality
p − τ − c/s = 0 (13)
must hold, a condition that implies zero proﬁt for carrier 2. But observe that, even though
c is viewed as parametric by carrier 2, c’s actual value depends on the magnitude of f1 + f2.
Therefore, writing c as c(f1+f2), condition (13) ends up determining an equilibrium value for
f2 conditional on f1. In eﬀect, for a given f1 value, f2 expands until 1/s times congestion cost
per ﬂight reaches p − τ, yielding zero proﬁt for airline 2.
T h er e s p o n s eo ff2 to an increase in f1 can be derived immediately given that (13) implies




indicating that an increase in f1 is fully oﬀset by a decrease in f2.
To derive the leader’s ﬂight choice, (14) is substituted into the ﬁrst-order condition for
choice of f1 (eq. (10)). Upon substitution, the term involving c   becomes zero, and (10)
reduces to (13). Thus, the equilibrium conditions for airlines 1 and 2 are identical, and since
they determine only the sum f1 + f2, the individual ﬂight levels are indeterminate.5
By assumption, carrier 2 behaves atomistically, ignoring the impact of its ﬂight choice on
airport congestion. The key implication of the above analysis is that carrier 1, in eﬀect, behaves
atomistically as well, even though it plays the role of a Stackelberg leader. In particular,
carrier 1’s ﬁrst-order condition, which mirrors the equilibrium condition for carrier 2, shows
no accounting for the eﬀect of its ﬂight choice on airport congestion. This failure to internalize
congestion arises because any change in f1 is completely oﬀset by adjustment of f2,s ot h a t
airport congestion is in fact insensitive to carrier 1’s choice.
The absence of internalizationimplies that the equilibriumﬂight volumes are too large, and
that the excess is greater than in the Cournot case from above, requiring a larger toll. Since the
(f1 + f2)c  /s term in the optimality condition (6) is absent in the equilibrium condition (13),
an atomistic toll, given by T =M C D ∗, is required. Thus, behavior that is either atomistic by
assumption (carrier 2) or eﬀectively atomistic (carrier 1) necessitates the use of atomistic tolls.
Summarizing yields
Proposition 2. With a Stackelberg leader and a competitive fringe, no congestion is
internalized and all carriers should be charged atomistic congestion tolls, equal to 100
percent of the marginal congestion damage from an extra ﬂight.
It is important to note that Proposition 2 also applies in a model with multiple leader
airlines, who interact in Cournot fashion with respect to one another while anticipating the
response of competitive fringe carriers. This case may describe a number of congested airports
where no carrier is dominant, such as New York-LaGuardia or Boston.
113. Do Weaker Assumptions Resurrect Internalization?
While the previous analysis shows that atomistic congestion tolls are required when a
Stackelberg leader interacts with a competitive fringe, conﬁrming Daniel’s view, it is impor-
tant to know whether this result continues to hold under weaker assumptions. To answer this
question, the analysis in this section begins by relaxing the assumption that demand is per-
fectly elastic, allowing the exercise of market power by the leader. Then, while maintaining
imperfectly elastic demand, the analysis allows the outputs of the leader and the fringe to be
imperfect rather than perfect substitutes.
3.1. Imperfectly elastic demand
When demand is imperfectly elastic, the full price p depends on total traﬃc s(f1+f2), with
the demand function written p = d[s(f1 + f2)], where d   < 0. To understand the impact of
this modiﬁcation in the Stackelberg/fringe setting, it is helpful to ﬁrst reconsider the Cournot
model. In that model, carrier 1’s ﬁrst-order condition (7) is replaced by
d + sf1d   − τ − (f1c   + c)/s =0 . (15)
Since the social optimum is given by d − τ − [(f1 + f2)c   + c]/s =0 ,w h e r ed replaces p in
(6), two distortions are evident in (15).6 Uninternalized congestion, reﬂected in the absence
of the f2c  /s term, tends to make f1 too large, while exercise of market power, reﬂected in the
presence of the negative term sf1d  , tends to make f1 too small. Whether f in the symmetric
equilibrium is then too large or too small relative to the social optimum is unclear.
Although a toll (or subsidy) per ﬂight can remedy the net distortion in this simple setup, a
more realistic network model generates a diﬀerent prescription. In such a model, the congested
airport serves a host of city-pair markets that may exhibit diﬀerent degrees of competition and
thus market-power distortions of varying severity. In this setting, achievement of the social
optimum requires Cournot congestion tolls to be levied at the airport level while subsidies,
designed to correct the market-power distortion, are paid at the level of the city-pair market.
Thus, uninternalized congestion and exploitation of market power are remedied by diﬀerent
instruments. Brueckner (2005) provides a full analysis of such a network model.
12Returning to the current non-network setting, consider again the case where a Stackelberg
leader interacts with a competitive fringe. The equilibrium condition (13) for the fringe is
replaced by
d − τ − c/s =0 , (16)
which once again determines f2 conditional on f1.S i n c eb o t hd and c depend on f1 + f2, (16)
requires a constant value for this sum, again implying that a change in f1 is fully oﬀset by
adjustment of f2, as in (14).
The leader’s ﬁrst-order condition (10) is replaced by



















After substituting (14), this condition reduces to (16), just as in the previous analysis. The
leader again fails to internalize congestion, but in addition, exploitation of market power (seen
in (15)) does not occur. In eﬀect, the leader ends up behaving just like a competitive carrier
when disciplined by the competitive fringe: it ignores congestion eﬀects and does not exploit
its market power. Only one distortion, uninternalized congestion, then needs correction, and
this correction is achieved through atomistic tolls. Therefore, Proposition 2 remains relevant
when demand is imperfectly elastic.
3.2. Imperfect substitutes: The case of full independence
To introduce imperfect substitutability, it is useful to ﬁrst consider the polar case where
the leader and the fringe oﬀer independent goods, with cross-price elasiticitiesequal to zero. In
this case, the full prices are given by p1 = d1(sf1)a n dp2 = d2(sf2), with d  
1,d 
2 < 0 (demands
continue to be imperfectly elastic).7
The fringe equilibrium condition then becomes
d2 − τ − c/s =0 , (18)
and since the argument of d2 is now sf2,n o ts(f1 + f2), the fringe response to a change in f1





c  /s − sd  
2
≡− µ. (19)
Since d  
2 < 0, it follows that µ lies between zero and 1, indicating that the fringe response does
not fully oﬀset a change in f1.
The implication for congestion tolls can again be seen in the leader’s ﬁrst-order condition,
w h i c hi sn o wg i v e nb y
d1 + sf1d  













Since ∂f2/∂f1 lies between −1 and 0, (20) reﬂects partial internalization of congestion rather
than its complete absence. To derive the corresponding toll, recall that, as in the Stackel-
berg/Cournot case, the toll must eliminate the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst term in brackets in





(1 + µ∗)MCD∗ (21)
where µ∗ equals µ evaluated at the social optimum (compare (12)). Thus, because 0 <µ ∗ < 1,
the leader’s toll lies between the Cournot toll of 1
2MCD∗ and the atomistic toll of MCD∗,
just as in the Stackelberg/Cournot case with perfectly elastic demand. The fringe, however,
continues to pay an atomistic toll.
Note that the market-power term from the Cournot model (see (15)) remains in (20). The
reason is that leader’s full price is independent of f2, which means that the oﬀsetting behavior
of the fringe does not restrain the exploitation of market power, in contrast to (17). The
market-power distortion thus requires a separate correction, as discussed above.
3.3. Imperfect substitutes: The general case
While the previousresults overturnProposition 2, a more comprehensivestatement requires
consideration of the general case, where substitutability between the leader and fringe outputs
14lies between the extremes of independence and perfect substitutes. As might be expected,
internalization of congestion in this intermediate case still occurs but is weaker than when the
carriers’ outputs are independent. Thus, the appropriate congestion toll for the leader moves
closer to the atomistic toll.
To generate the inverse demand functions for the intermediate case, consider the primitive
demand functions sf1 = D1(p1,p 2)a n dsf2 = D2(p1,p 2), which give traﬃc for the leader and
the fringe as functions of the full prices. The own-price derivatives for these functions are
assumed to be negative, while the cross-price derivatives are positive. Inverting the demand
functions yields the inverse functions p1 = d1(sf1,sf 2)a n dp2 = d2(sf1,sf 2), whose properties




























assumption is that an increase in either full price reduces total traﬃc, so that ∂s(f1+f2)/∂p1 =
D1
1+D1
2 < 0a n d∂s(f1+f2)/∂p2 = D2
1+D2
2 < 0. These inequalities imply Ω > 0 and thus that






















indicating that a carrier’s full price falls by more when its own ﬂight volume increases than
when volume for the other carrier rises.
To ﬁnd the response of the fringe to an increase in f1 in this new setting, the equilibrium





c  /s − sd1
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2
≡− η. (25)
15Using (24), it follows that η in (25) satisﬁes 0 <η<1. Note also that (25) reduces to (19)
in the independent case, where d1




Holding the own-price eﬀect constant, so that the magnitude of d2
2 equals that of d  
2 in
the independent case, the presence of the extra term in the numerator means that η in (25) is
closer to 1 than is µ in (19). As a result, relative to the independent case, the fringe more fully
oﬀsets an increase in f1 with intermediate substitutability. Thus, less internalization occurs
than in the independent case, which implies that the leader’s toll moves closer to the atomistic




(1 + η∗)MCD∗, (26)
where the asterisk on η again indicates evaluation at the optimum. Since η∗ >µ ∗ is satisﬁed
holding the own-price price eﬀect constant, the toll in (26) is larger than the one in (21).8
Summarizing all of the above results yields
Proposition 3. When a Stackelberg leader interacts with a competitive fringe, atom-
istic congestion tolls are still required when demand is imperfectly inelastic, as long
as the carriers’ outputs are perfect substitutes. But when substitutability is imperfect,
congestion is partially internalized, and the leader’s congestion toll lies between the
Cournot toll and the atomistic toll.
Judging the practical implications of Proposition 3 requires knowledge of the extent of
substitutability among the outputs oﬀered by diﬀerent airlines. Given that most empirical
work on the industry implicitly assumes that substitutability is perfect, evidence on this issue
is scant. From one perspective, it could be argued that airline seats have a “commodity”
status, with little fundamental product diﬀerentiation evident. While this view implies that
substitutability should be close to perfect, airline frequent-ﬂier programs constitute a powerful
tool for inducing brand loyalty, thus limiting the extent of substitutability.9 The upshot is
that the airline outputs may not be perfect substitutes, but the extent of substitutability is
probably large compared to other industries. If this view is correct, then the toll structure
implied by Proposition 3 may be close to atomistic.
164. Discussion
A key focus of the internalization debate is on dominated hub airports, and proper con-
gestion pricing for such airports depends critically on which of the above models is relevant,
as noted above. If the Stackelberg model with a competitive fringe is relevant, then the hub
carrier as well as the other airlines using the airport should be charged congestion tolls that
are atomistic, or approximately so. On the other hand, if the Cournot model is relevant, then
the hub carrier should be charged a low toll that approaches zero as its ﬂight share nears 100
percent, a conclusion that could be used to argue against levying any tolls at all dominated
hubs. Thus, the two models are diametrically opposed in their recommendations for congestion
pricing at hub airports.
A similar, but less dramatic, contrast arises for other airports, such as New York-LaGuardia
or Boston, that are congested but have no dominant carrier. At such airports, the Cournot
model prescribes levying congestion tolls that are nonatomistic but still appreciable. For
example, the Cournot toll would equal 2
3MCD∗ at an airport with 3 symmetric carriers. But
as mentioned above, as long as a competitive fringe operates at such an airport, with the major
carriers anticipating its response, atomistic tolls equal to MCD∗ (or tolls near this value) are
again required, a 50 percent increase over the Cournot toll in the given example.
Where does the discussion in this paper leave us in appraising the internalization debate?
The present analysis shows that Daniel’s theoretical argument against the internalization hy-
pothesis can be valid in a simple model like that used in the rest of the literature. Whether
the implication of this argument (the need for atomistic, or approximately atomistic, tolls
at every congested airport) should be embraced depends partly on a judgment regarding the
realism of the competing models. In other words, is it realistic to assume that a congested
airport’s smallest carriers are small enough to view overall congestion as independent of their
decisions but large enough for their responses to neutralize internalization by the airport’s
major carriers? The answer is unclear. Empirical evidence on internalization exists, of course,
but it oﬀers conﬂicting messages, as explained earlier. While the demonstrated empirical link
between airport delays and concentration favors the internalization hypothesis, this evidence
is indirect. By contrast, Daniel’s contradictory evidence based on intraday ﬂight patterns is
17suggestive but not very transparent.
In the face of these ambiguities, a possible stance in the internalization debate is suggested
by the results of a recent paper by Morrison and Winston (2006). These authors show that,
even if internalizationis assumed to occur, the welfareloss from levying inappropriate atomistic
congestion tolls is relatively small. These ﬁndings could provide support for a congestion-
pricing policy that ignores potential internalization of congestion. This approach is the right
one if Daniel is correct, and although it is wrong otherwise, the resulting welfare loss may be
tolerable.
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19Footnotes
∗We thank Joe Daniel and Leonardo Basso for helpful comments.
1See also Daniel (2001) and Daniel and Pahwa (2000).
2Reconciling the literature’s empirical results is challenging because, even though the Daniel
and Harback’s (2007) results do not uniformly reject internalization, which is evident at
a few of the 27 airports they study, Mayer and Sinai’s (2003) ﬁndings show a signiﬁcant
(though modest) eﬀect of airport-concentration on delays in a sample covering more than
250 airports. Their model uses airport ﬁxed eﬀects, along with a massive amount of data
on delays for individual ﬂights.
3The other endpoints connected to the airport are assumed to be uncongested. Note that in
a more detailed model, p would vary across endpoints.
4See Forbes (2006) for empirical evidence that airport congestion reduces fares.
5Since both carriers eﬀectively behave in competitive fashion, this indeterminacy is natural.
Note also that, with (13) holding, proﬁt for carrier 1 is zero.
6The social optimum now maximizes consumer surplus plus proﬁt.
7When imperfect substitutability is added to the perfectly-elastic-demand case of section 2.5,
full prices are ﬁxed but potentially diﬀerent across carriers. It is easy see, however, that
p1 = p2 must hold for both the leader and the fringe to operate in equilibrium.
8It should be noted that imperfect substitutability has virtually no eﬀect in the Cournot case.
The only required modiﬁcation is the substitution of d1 and d1
1 in place of d and d   in (15).
9Service quality diﬀerences, such as the availability of a direct ﬂight when competitors only
oﬀer connecting ﬂights, may also limit substitutability.
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